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COMMENT
PROTECTION AND ALIENABILITY OF REAL PROPERTY
INTERESTS UNDER THE FLORIDA RECORDING STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The modem American, as an investor, as a semi-migrant home owner,
as a maximum-money mortgagee or as a creditor, requires protection of his
interests in land to the fullest extent that the law can provide. One method
of protection is by the use of what is commonly known as a "recording act."
This is an attempt to show how Florida has strived to achieve this goal and
the extent that it has succeeded through its recording act and judicial
constructions.
It is the court's constructions of this act which have attempted to sat-
isfy the socially necessary attributes of land-maximum alienability and
maximum protection with minimum defeasbilities. In this never-ending
process, the court has considered the purpose and scope of the act, presump-
tions and burden of proof and the effect of fraud, duress, forgery and mis-
take. In the process they have been faced with problems of constructive
notice, actual notice, estoppel and possession affecting the priorities of
original parties, mortgagees, creditors, purchasers at execution sales, mech-
anics' lienholders and a few special parties. These are the factors and
problems to be considered.
IT. GENERALLY
History, Scope and Purpose. The recording statute was passed in Ter-
ritorial Florida on November 15, 1828. It stands, after 123 years, with no
important change2 (except for the 1941 amendment which added the last
two paragraphs):
No conveyance, transfer or mortgage of real property, or of
any interest therein, nor any lease for a term of one year or longer,
shall be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or
subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without
notice, unless the same be recorded according to law; nor shall any
such instrument made or executed by virtue of any power of attor-
nev be good or effectual in law or in equity against creditors or
subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without no-
tice unless the power of attorney be recorded before the accruing
of the right of such creditors or subsequent purchaser.
Grantees by quit-claim, heretofore or hereafter made, shall be
1. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1951).
2. History of the statute: REV. STAT. (1892) § 197, GE. STAT. (1906) § 2480,
REv. GEN. STAT. (1920) § 3822, CoMP. GEN. LAws; (1927) § 5698. Cart v. Thomas,
18 Fla. 736 (1882), held Fla. Laws 1873, e. 1939 § 5, making void deeds unrecorded
within six months of execution, to be unconstitutional.
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deemed and held to be bona fide purchasers without notice within
the meaning of the recording acts;
Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to quit-
claims heretofore made, the priority of which shall be contested
by suit commenced within one year of the effective date of this law.
The court early decided that the "object of this statutc is to disclose
to the world the holder of the legal title, in order that purchasers for value
might be protccted against the secret deeds of the grantor.'' : To this extent,
the statute was merely curative in nature;4 its purpose was not to convey
title, or create a lien? However, it does purpose to convey some interest since
it has been held that an unrecorded deed does not vest an absolute estate
but leaves in the grantor a power of divestment that can even descend to
his administrator. " hus . . .the absolute title remains in the grantor in
abeyance until the deed is recorded . ,,7 Its main effect is to give con-
structive notice of all recorded instruments to all who might be bound to
search for them8 and to create an estoppel in those failing to record? The
court has properly restricted this effect to documents 0 and covenants"
within the chain of title required to be recorded under the statute.'2  Simi-
larly, the court has held that proper documents improperly prepared and
not entitled to recordation do not have this effect even though admitted to
record.'
3
Burden of Proof and Presumptions. A purchaser or creditor with actual
notice is not protected by the statute. The burden of proof is upon one
claiming under the unrecorded instrument to show notice to the recorded
party or his privy. There is a rebuttable presumption of bona fides in a
grantee of record.' 4
Effect of Fraud, Duress, Mistake and Forgery. Under the general prin-
ciple, "To hold that a man's land is to be forfeited and sold for the debt of an-
other for which indebtedness he is in no manner responsible, is inconsistent
with justice and abhorrent to equity,"' 5 the court has refused to give effect
3. Emerson v. Ross' Ex'x, 17 Fla. 122, 135 (1879): Billings v. Stark, 15 Fla. 297
(1875) ("... to prevent fraud by parties concealing the fact of a conveyance to a bona
fide purchaser without notice.").
4. Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 153 Fa. 501, 15 So.2d 175 (1943).
5. Hunter v. State Bank, 65 Fla. 202, 61 So. 497 (1913).
6. Emerson v. Ross' Ex'x, 17 Fla. 122 (1879).
7. Ballard v. Lippman, 32 Fla. 481, 487, 14 So. 154, 156 (1893).
8. Luria v. Bank of Coral Gables, 106 Fla. 175, 142 So. 901 (1932).
9. Drawdy v. Lake Josephine Co., 149 Fla. 756, 1 So.2d 631 (1941); Hart v.
Lake Josephine Co., 149 Fla. 754, 1 So.2d 635 (1941); Holbrook v. Betton, 5 Fla. 99(1853.10. Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939).
11. Volunteer Security Co. v. Dow], 159 Fla. 767, 33 So.2d 150 (1947).
12. Garrett v. Fernauld, 63 Fla. 434, 57 So. 671 (1912); Mansfield v. Johnson, 51
Fla. 239, 40 So. 196 (1906).
13. Lassiter v. Curtiss-Bright Co., 129 Fla. 728, 177 So. 201 (1937).
14. West Coast Lumber Co. v. Griffin, 56 Fla. 878, 48 So. 36 (1909); Feinberg
V. Stearns, 56 Fla. 279, 47 So. 799 (1908); Lake v. Hancock, 38 Fla. 53, 20 So. 811
(1896).
15. Houston v. Forman, 92 Fla. 1, 6, 109 So. 297, 298 (1926).
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to recorded deeds procured by fraud," ', duress'7 or forgery,'S unaccompanied
by the clement of estoppel.' The rule, however, appears to be that a bona
fide purchaser without notice and for value is protected by recording under
the statute if he purchases from a fraudulent grantor who is estopped2 0 to
assert his fraud or from a grantor by mistake.2 1 The distinction appears to
be made between void and voidable titles, although the court has not spe-
cifically discussed the problem in this light.
Ill. NOTIC, ESIOPPEL AND POSSESSION
Constructive Notice. As has been so often expressed by the court,
constructive notice is the backbone of the statute-the cffect of recorded
instruments.' 2  To obtain this effect, the instruments must be properly
executed, '-'5 proved, 4 acknowledged25 and within the chain of title.2 6  It is
not necessary, however, that the instrument be recorded in the proper book,2 7
thus placing the burden on the abstractor to search all books.
The court has never given a very complete definition of constructive
notice other than that it is " . . . notice imputed to a person not having
actual notice,"2 amounting to a "legal inference. ' '2 1,1 This legal inference of
notice is cast upon the subsequent purchaser and creditor not only as to
what is actually exhibited in the record' but also as to facts discernible by a
reasonably prudent man if the records were examined. aI The recordation
of one mortgage imputes no notice of unrecorded mortgages and contracts
between the same parties held in one running account by the mortgagee.3 2
Constructive notice of other matter not of record has been held to
have been given by the recording of an instrument. Examples are plats;33
16. Id. at 1, 109 So. at 297.
17. Hall v. Forman, 94 Fla. 682, 114 So. 560 (1927).
18. WVright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940) (the statute of limitations
is inapplicable to such a deed though it remains on record for more than twenty years).
19. Houston v. Forman, 92 Fla. 1, 109 So. 297 (1926).
20. Neal v. Gregory, 19 Fla. 356 (1882).
21. Lusk v. Reel, 36 Fla. 418, 18 So. 582 (1895).
22. Emerson v. Ross' Ex'x, 17 Fla. 122 (1879); Billings v. Stark, 15 Fla. 297
(1875). Drawdy v. Lake Josephine Co., 149 1la. 756, I So.2d 631 (1941) held that a
recorded mortgage was constructive notice to an adverse possessor.
23. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939).
24. Edwards v. Thom, 25 Fla. 222, 5 So. 707 (1889).
25. Hall v. Forman, 94 Fla. 632, 114 So. 560 (1927).
26. Volunteer Security Co. v. Dowi, 159 Fla. 767, 33 So.2d 150 (1947); Pierson
v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939); Garrett v. Fernauld, 63 Fla. 434, 57 So. 671
(1912); Mansfield v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 239, 40 So. 196 (1906).
27. Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738 (1910); Ivey
v. Dawley, 50 Fla. 537, 39 So. 498 (1905).
28. Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 255, 141 So. 124, 127 (1932).
29. Ibid.
30. Davis v. Brewer, 135 Fla. 752, 186 So. 207 (1939); Tyler v. Johnson, 61 Fla.
730, 55 So. 870 (1911).
31. Kemp v. Skivesen, 114 Fla. 667, 154 So. 688 (1934).
32. Battle v. Jennings Naval Stores Co., 74 Fla. 12, 75 So. 949 (1917).
33. Merrell v. Ridgely, 62 Fla. 546, 57 So. 352 (1912); Price v. Stratton, 45 Fla.
535, 33 So. 644 (1903).
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court orders creating the power of the actors;34 address of owner;35 a clause
of refusal to assume described mortgages, themselves not of record;30 a clause
showing purchase money to be part in cash, part by mortgage, though the
mortgage is not recorded; 3 and restrictions in the chain of title showing that
all lots in a certain subdivision are affected2a6 In the case of an ambiguity
in the recorded instrument there is notice only if a reasonably prudent man
would find it advisable to investigate further. 9
An interesting statement appears in one case to the effect that since
land purchased during a boom period is almost always purchased with the
aid of mortgage money, this fact might be used in conjunction with other
factors, but is insufficient of itself, to create constructive notice of a
mortgage.
40
Quit-Claim Deeds. Before the 1941 amendment, a purchaser under
a quit-claim deed could not be a bona-fide purchaser without notice." The
court had previously realized the gross inequities of this situation, and had
refused to extend this rule to the remote grantee, to prevent a bad rule from
becoming worse. 4-rhe effect of the amendment is clearly to place all deeds
on a par.
Actual Notice and Bona Fide Purchasers. Since only bona fide purch-
asers without notice arc protected, 43 the court has had to determine what
amounts to actual notice. The court, in defining actual notice, divided it
into express and implied; express order was held to be "direct information"4
and implied notice to be "notice inferred from the fact that the person had
means of knowledge which it was his duty to use and which he did not
use." ', Consequently, implied actual notice is an "inference of fact"46 to
be distinguished from constructive notice, which is an "inference of law."47
34. H.B. Claflin Co. v. King, 56 Fla. 767, 48 So. 37 (1909).
35. Davock v. Whealon, 156 Fla. 670, 24 So.2d 46 (1945); cf. Davis v. Brewer,
135 Fla. 752, 186 So. 207 (1939).
36. Pierson v. Bill, 133 Fla. 81, 182 So. 631, on rehearing, 134 Fla. 594, 184 So.
124 (1938), appaealed from retrial, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939).
37. Kemp v. Skivesen, 114 Fla. 667, 154 So. 688 (1934).
38. Hall v. Snavely, 93 Fla. 664, 112 So. 551 (1927).
39. Bright v. Buehman, 39 Fed. 243 (N.D. Fla. 1889).
40. Pierson v. Bill, 133 Fla. 81, 87, 182 So. 631, 633 (1938).
41. Braddy & Hale Fishery Co. v. Thomas, 93 Fla. 326, 112 So. 55 (1927); Fries
v. Griffin, 35 Fla. 21, 17 So. 266 (1895); Snow v. Lake's Adm'r. 20 Fla. 656 (1884).
42. Rabinowitz v. Keefer, 100 Fla. 1723, 132 So. 297 (1931) (Ellis, J., dissenting),
asked how far back is remoteness); Rabinowitz v. Hawk, 100 Fla. 44, 129 So. 501 (1930).
43. Lee v. Sas, 53 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1951); Cone Bros. Const. Co. v. Moore, 141
Fla. 420, 193 So. 288 (1940); Williams v. Neeld-Gordon Co., 86 Fla. 59, 97 So. 315
(1923); Bowen v. Grace, 64 Fla. 28, 59 So. 563 (1912); Ward v. Spively, 18 Fla. 847
(1882).





Actual notice must be affirmatively alleged and proved,48 and is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.
4
9
Where a person with an unrecorded contract for deed informs the sub-
sequent purchaser of his contract and advises him to search the record,
though the search of the record is fruitless, the prior unrecorded contract
takes precedence since the subsequent purchaser had actual notice. 0 An
express assumption clause is actual notice of a right of redemption,
Attesting an unrecorded document,5 2 knowledge of facts that in law create
a vendor's lien 3 and acting as agent in an unrecorded transaction5 4 are addi-
tional situations which the court has held to warrant a finding of actual
notice.
The court refused, however, to find actual notice where there was actual
notice to a fiduciary of the defendant,3 5 a latent ambiguity' and a rumor in
the community of which the subsequent purchaser was not a member.57
In order for a purchaser to be protected, he must continue without no-
tice until the consideration passes.58
Failure to record and estappel. Failure to record, no matter for how
short a time, creates an estoppel against the non-recording party in favor of
those who secure a subsequent interest in the property whether or not they
relied on the record and regardless of whether the subsequent interest is
recorded. 59 This estoppel has been held to be entirely consistent with the
Florida Constitution and statutes.0" This detriment to the prior interest
holder if he does not record, plus the benefit of constructive notice if he
does, are the inducements to effect an immediate recordation of instruments.
One may also lose his rights to the property by an "equitable estop-
pel."02 This estoppel was first applied to persons claiming land under pat-
ents not yet issued0 2 and immediately limited to situations where the facts
48. Kearnes v. Hill, 21 Fla. 185 (1885).
49. Sirlin v. Schupler, 90 Fla. 68, 105 So. 151 (1925).
50. Cantrell v. Herring, 144 Fla. 576, 198 So. 206 (1940).
51. Luria v. Bank of Coral Gables, 106 Fla. 175, 142 So. 90 (1932).
52. Thompson v. Maxwell, 16 Fla. 773 (1878).
53. Bowen v. Grace, 64 Fla. 28, 59 So. 563 (1912).
54. Gamble v. Hamilton, 31 Fla. 401, 12 So. 229 (1893); cf. Blackburn v. Venice
Inlet Co., 38 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1948).
55. Luria v. Bank of Coral Gables, 106 Fla. 175, 142 So. 901 (1932).
56. Rambo v. Dickinson, 92 Fla. 758, 110 So. 352 (19261.
57. Hopkins v. O'Brien, 57 Fla. 444, 49 So. 936 (1909).
58. Standard Oil Co. v. Mehrtens, 96 Fla. 455, 118 So. 216 (1928). But cf.
Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928), where the court in weighing
two equitable interests gave favor to the subsequent purchaser, who had clothed himself
with the legal title before the recordation of the prior equitable interest, and stated that
it made no difference that the purchase price had not yet been paid.
59. McCahill v. Travis Co., 45 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1950); Van Eepoel Real Estate Co.
v. Sarasota Milk Co., 100 Fla. 438, 129 So. 892 (1930).
60. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939).
61. Coram v. Palmer, 63 Fla. 116, 58 So. 721 (1912). This appears to be what
Ls more correctly termed estoppel by laches, a type of equitable estoppel.
62. Ibid; Hagen v. Ellis, 39 F1a. 463, 22 So. 727 (1897).
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are not available to both parties.63  It is also available as a defense where a
party is actively misled even though the instrument is recorded.64
Possession. Possession is another element that can defeat an otherwise
perfect record title, since a purchaser or creditor is bound by the unrecorded
rights of the occupants at the time of the transaction. 5 The court has vari-
ously termed the notice created by possession as constructive, 6 actual6 and
implied actual notices and has given possession the same effect as recorda-
tion.Y Such possession must not be casual or temporary", but must resem-
ble that required for adverse possession; that is, it must be open, notorious,
visible, exclusive and continuous.7 Inclosure and cultivation, 2 or using the
land for its only value, e.g., firewood, is sufficient. 73 Instances of insufficient
possession include: where the land involved was everglade land mostly under
water and therefore incapable of possession; 74 where an agent cultivated only
a few acres of a large parcel;' 5 where tenants continued in possession but
paid rent to the prior grantee;76 and where the grantee merely surveyed the
land, dug holes to test the soil and displayed the land to prospective pur-
chasers.7 No conclusive rule has been formulated where one tenant in
common holds possession for the other.78  Each case must be resolved in
light of its individual facts and the general rule stated above.70
IV. PARTIES UNDER THE STATUTE
Original Parties. Consistent with the purpose of the statute, recording
has no effect on the original parties to the instrument since neither is a sub-
63. Price v. Stratton, 45 Fla. 535, 33 So. 644 (1903).
64. E.g., Elizabethport Cordage Co. v. Whitlock, 37 Fla. 190, 20 So. 255 (1896).
65. Bright v. Buchman, 39 Fed. 243 (N.D. Ea. 1889); Ellis v. Everett, 79 Fla.
493, 84 So. 617 (1920); McRae v. McMinn, 17 Fla. 876 (1880). Crozier v. Ange, 85
Fla. 120, 95 So. 426 (1923), held that possession by insane grantor at time of execution
of mortgage by grantee put mortgagee on notice as to grantor's capacity.
66. E.g., Scott v. Simmons, 151 Fla. 628, 10 So.2d 122 (1942); Marion Mortgage
Co. v. Grennan, 106 Fla. 913, 143 So. 761 (1932).
67. Ellis v. Everett, 79 Fla. 493, 84 So. 617 (1920).
68. See Reasoner v. Fiskelli, 114 Fla. 102, 105, 153 So. 98, 99 (1934).
69. Massey v. Hubbard, 18 Fla. 688 (1882).
70. Scott v. Simmons, 151 Fla. 628, 10 So.2d. 122 (1942).
71. Ellis v. Everett, 79 Fla. 493, 84 So. 617 (1920); Carolina Portland Cement
Co. v. Roper, 68 Fla. 299, 67 So. 115 (1914); Tate v. Pensacola Gulf, Land & Develop-
ient Co., 37 Fla. 439, 20 So. 542 (1896).
72. Ellis v. Everett, 79 Fla. 493, 84 So. 617 (1920).
73. Tate v. Pensacola Gulf, Land & Development Co., 37 Fla. 439, 20 So. 542
(1896).
74. McCahill v. Travis Co., 45 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1950).
75. Hopkins v. O'Brien, 57 Fla. 444, 49 So. 936 (1909).
76. Stockton v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 45 Fla. 590, 34 So. 897 (1903).
77. Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Roper, 68 Fla. 299, 67 So. 115 (1914).
78. Ellis v. Everett, 79 Fla. 493, 84 So. 617 (1920); Tyler v. Johnson, 61 Fla. 73(
55 So. 870 (1911).
79. Ellis v. Everett, 79 Fla. 493, 84 So. 617 (1920).
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sequent purchaser or creditor.80 Nor is the purpose of the act to givc notice
to the grantor."'
Mortgagees. Basically the rights and liabilities of a mortgagee parallel
those of a grantee. He is deemed a purchaser to the extent of his interest
and is so protected by recordation to the extent of that interest."-' For ex-
ample, a recorded mortgage securing future advances is protected to the
extent of the advances, provided that the purpose and extent of the advances
are explicitly stated with enough information to ascertain the anount
advanced.83  An early opinion declaring an unrecorded mortgage a mere
nullity84 has been disregarded by later courts since if it has no other cffect,
it is still good as between the original parties. s5
'[here are, however, a few situations unique to mortgages under the
recording statute. Where the mortgagee, intending to substitute a new
mortgage, files a satisfaction of his claim without the debt being paid, a true
estoppel may defeat the new mortgage; however, the court will probably
require relian'ce by the new claimantY. 6  It is important to notice that al-
though an assignee of the mortgage may be estopped by constructive notice
of the recording statute, this alone is not sufficient to make him male fides
as to the note under the recording statute."7 It should be noted that an
assignment of a mortgage has been held not to be an interest in land, but
only an assignment of a lien, and as such is not required to be recorded
within the purview of this statute88
Creditors. Creditors must have reduced their claims to liens, the
statute does not refer to general creditors. ' This construction is imperative
since the whole purpose of the statute would otherwise be destroyed, as an
abstractor could never check all possibilities. With the exception that lien
rights attach only the beneficial interest of the debtor, the lien-creditor has
the same rights and protection as other parties under the statute.90  This
beneficial interest, of course, may be enlarged by defenses of estoppel and
80. Licata v. DeCortc, 50 Fla. 563, 39 So. 58 (1905); see Hams v. Marshall. 43
F.2d 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 822 (1930); Stewart v. Mathews, 19 Fla.
752 (1883).
81, State ex rel, Dixon v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 20 Fla. 402 (1884)
(defendant had issued both a prior equitable interest to plaintiff who recorded and a
subsequent legal title to a third party).
82, Sauer v. Florida K.R., 227 Fed. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Warner v. Watson, 35
Fla. 402, 17 So. 654 (1895).
83. Bullock v. Fender, 140 Fla. 448, 192 So. 167 (1939).
84. McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276, 21 So. 193 (1896).
85, See Hams v. Marshall, 43 F.2d 703 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied. 282 U.S. 822
(1930) (although the mortgage is good as between the parties under § 47 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act I11 U.S.C. § 75 (1946)] it is not good as against the trustee in bankruptcy).
86. See Elizabethport Cordgage Co. v. Whitlock, 37 Fla. 190, 20 So. 255 (1896).
87. Taylor v. American National Bank, 64 Fla. 525, 60 So. 783 (1913).
88. Garrett v. Fernauld, 63 Fla. 434, 57 So. 671 (1912).
89. Ringling Trust & Savings Bank v. Whitfield Estates, 32 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 573 (1929); Rogers v. Munnerlyn, 36 Fla. 591, 18 So. 669 (1895);
Eldridge, Dunham & Co. v. Post, 20 Fla. 579 (1884).
90. See Smith v. Pattishall, 127 Fla. 474, 176 So. 568 (1937).
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constructive notice. 1 Where the debts were not incurred in reliance on
ownership the court has restricted the creditor's rights to protect a more
deserving unrecorded equitable interest? 2 When there is a possibility of a
subsequent transfer of title of a fraudulent nature the recordation is only
evidence of the execution and not of the intent of the debtor.05
Execution Purchasers. The rights of an execution purchaser are those
of a lienbolder.94 Thus, if the lienholder had notice of unrecorded claims,
either actual or constructive, before judgment, the purchaser takes subject
to those claims."" An exception is made of a vendee under a contract for
deed who acquires his vendor's title at a sheriff's sale, since the vendee is
estopped to deny liability of the obligation under which he acquired posses-
sion. 96 The only interest the vendee acquires is to the extent of the amount
paid at the sale.0 7
Mechanics' Lienholders. By statute 8 labor and material supplied in
enhancing the value of land is of itself constructive notice of a mechanic's
lien. 9 If work is started before the competing interest is 'recorded, the
competing interest holder is estopped. 100 The effect of recording a mechan-
ic's lien is not to create a new interest but to preserve the interest created
at the time of the visible commencement of the work? 0' The court has
intimated, but not held, that the commencement of work is constructive
notice of a continuiig contract and a subsequent recordation of a competing
right is ineffective against the entire contract. 10 2 The unpaid amount on a
construction mortgage, however, is deemed prior to mechanics' lien rights.103
Special Parties. The court has recognized a few special parties, the
very nature of whose instruments give constructive notice, when recorded,
of the factors giving rise to their power to act. When the instrument is
that of a guardian 04 or an administrator, 1 5 a subsequent party, to protect
himself, must look to the court records to ascertain the authority with which
the fiduciary acted and the propriety of the transaction, as such subsequent
91, Ibid.; Miller v. Berry, 78 Fla. 98, 82 So. 764 (1919).
92, Laganke v. Sutter, 137 Fla. 71, 187 So. 586 (1939); Petit v. Coachman, 51
Fla. 521, 41 So. 401 (1906); see American Freehold Land.& Mortgage Co. v. Maxwell,
39 Fla. 489, 22 So. 751 (1897).
93. Beasley v. Coggins, 48 Fla. 215, 37 So. 213 (1904).
94. Mansfield v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 239, 40 So. 196 (1906); Doyle v. Wade, 23 Fla.
90, 1 So. 516 (1887).
95. Jacobs v. Scheurer, 62 Fla. 216, 57 So. 356 (1912); Licata v. DeCorte, 50 Fla.
563, 39 So, 58 (1905).
96. Latin-American Bank v. Roger, 87 Fla. 147, 99 So. 546 (1924).
97. Ibid.
98. FLA. STAT. C. 84 (1951). For review of this statute, see Comment, 6 MIAxII
L. Q. 246 (1952).
99. People's Bank of Jacksonville v. Arbuckle, 82 Fla. 479, 90 So. 458 (1921).
100. Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co., 100 Fla. 438, 129 So. 892
(1930).
101. Ibid.
102. See People's Bank of Jacksonville v. Arbuckle, 82 Fla. 479, 90 So. 458 (1921).
103. Ibid.
104. Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124 (1932).
105. Rinehart v. Phelps, 150 Fla. 382, 7 So.Zd 783 (1942).
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party is bound by these records. Of a similar nature are the instruments of
a trustee08 and an escrowee;107 the subsequent party must look to the
authority given them. The signing of "X, trustee," is sufficient to put the
purchaser on inquiry. 08
V. CONCLUSION
We now return to our original query: Has Florida achieved the social-
ly necessary attributes to land titles via the recording act and its construc-
tional incidents? In the light of what has preceded let us observe graphically
the problem that exists: If A conveys to B who does not record until after
A conveys to C, even though he does so before C records, C will prevail as
between B and C, since B is estopped.'00 However, if C refrains from re-
cording until after B conveys to D, is C estopped as to D? D had no way of
ascertaining C's rights, but since B allowed A, the common grantor, to retain
his "power of divestment," A's exercise of it by conveying to C sapped the
vitality from B's deed and D is thus actually outside the chain of title and
must look to B for recompensation, if any."0 The situation can be further
complicated by the introduction of possession, void titles, actual knowledge
and estoppel-all factors which the remote grantee must take into considera-
tion,I' with little or no opportunity of being able to ascertain them in
advance.11
2
It is important to consider whether all of these defeasible characteris-
tics are socially necessary when weighed against the competing value of the
"clear title."
The element appearing most unjust and least desirable is possession.
To allow possession as constructive notice of the occupants' rights would
seem to defeat the object of the legislature-to reduce to record as many
interests in land as are practicable. The fact that the interest-bolder is
given the same protection as recordation by his occupancy, negatives the
inducement and pressure of the statute. Practical aspects should no longer
deter the courts from rectifying this situation, since transportation and
communication have become rapid and convenient and filing has become
inexpensive and simplified. If the occupant's interest is worth protection,
it is worth the minor inconvenience of recording to protect it, especially
when measured by our yardstick of protection to the future title holder.
106. H.B. Claflin Co. v. King, 56 Fla. 767, 48 So. 37 (1909).
107. Ullendorff v. Graham, 80 Fla. 845, 87 So. 50 (1920).
108. H.B. Claflin Co. v. King, 56 Fla. 767, 48 So. 37 (1909).
109. See Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co., 100 Fla. 438, 444, 129
So. 892, 895 (1930).
110. See Key West Wharf & Coal Co. v. Porter, 63 Fla. 448, 58 So. 599 (1912),
where the court held that one claiming title under one who is estopped is also estopped.
111. The purchaser can protect himself to a great extent by title insurance and by
warranties in his deed.
112. Most mechanics' liens can be ascertained in advance by an inspection of the
property and guarded against by requiring the execution of a waiver of liens for recent
work.
MIAMI LAXV QUARTERLY
No solution appears at hand to vitiate the effect of void titles nor does
it seem socially desirable to change this.
Should actual knowledge by the immediate grantee defeat the remote
grantee? As the statute now stands, it is impossible to arrive at any other
construction. However, this segment of the law seems in need of rectifi-
cation since it serves as a loophole to introduce a parol defeasance of perhaps
only an off-chance finding by the immediate grantee. The better pattern is
to allow actual notice to defeat the immediate grantee. A remote grantee
without notice should be allowed protection of the recording statute as
though he had been the immediate grantee without notice, in which case
the unrecorded interest holder would nevertheless have lost his priority.
The element of estoppel by constructive notice demonstrated in the
hypothet above is the basic effect of the statute" 3 and only by construing
the statute as based entirely on priority of recording, as in a few states,114
can this element be eliminated. As to the immediate parties, the Florida
judicial interpretation is entirely just, but as to the remote grantee is a
definite burden.
In the last two elements, actual knowledge and estoppel, the bridge
between justice to the immediate grantee of imperfect title, and the injus-
tice to the remote grantee should be the concern of the court and the
legislature. It must be assumed that the immnediate grantee, mortgagee or
relying creditor will exercise all of the reasonable precautions to protect
himself by procuring:
(1) abstract of title;
(2) opinion of title;
(3) check of occupancy;
(4) insurance, if possible;
(5) immediate recordation.
In a recent case the court had reason to stress this, saying: "This is
another of those unfortunate instances commonly resulting in losses and
litigation, wherein a business man failed to procure legal counsel at the out-
set in handling the legal details of a real estate transaction and entrusted
them to a "real estate dealer.' The real estate dealer failed to have the title
examined by legal counsel, and failed to promptly record the deed when it
was delivered by the grantor. Except for the fact that the original agree-
ments had been placed on record-though plaintiff did not know this at the
time-plaintiff might have lost his entire investment in the property. If
plaintiff had only exercised ordinary prudence in having his title examined
when lie purchased the property, this litigation, and the possibility of loss,
could easily have been averted."115
113. PArON, LAND ITLES § 9 (1938).
114, Louisiana, Massachusetts and North Carolina. See Id. § 8.
115. Michaels v. Albert Pick & Co., 158 Fla. 877, 882, 30 So.2d 498, 501 (1947).
COMMENT
Despite the foregoing criticisms, it must be admitted precisely what
the act has achieved:
(1) It provides a public storehouse for records, relieving
the owner of the obligation to retain and preserve his
muniments of title;
(2) It places all the records in one convenient location for
cross-referencing;
(3) It displays to the world, with the few exceptions noted
above, the priorities of the recording parties and the
extent of their interests.
Certainly this is a long step from the English custom of requiring each
to preserve his own instruments in the best way that he can. 116 The day
of the homestead existing in the same family generation following genera-
tion has acceded to the concept of movement to follow the occupation, or
the sun. Thus, the law must recognize the social factors that make it
necessary to continue to strive for a freely alienable and protected title that
can be ascertained expeditiously and inexpensively.
ROBERT E. DOOLEY
116. PATTON, LAND TITLES § 5 (1938).
